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Abstract: The aim of this research was to provide further evidence of the impact of the power of the
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) on corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure. Additionally, we
explore the moderating role of CEO compensation linked to shareholder return on the association
between CEO power and CSR disclosure. The theories used follow agency theory and stakeholder
theory and the sample comprised 9182 international firm-year observations collected from the
Thomson Reuters database from 2009 to 2018. Our model was estimated using the generalized
method of moments (GMM) estimator. The results found that CEO power was positively associated
with CSR disclosure, contrary to our expectations. Additionally, our evidence also shows that CEO
compensation linked to shareholder return plays a positive moderating role on the relationship
between CEO power and CSR reporting.
Keywords: CEO power; corporate social responsibility reporting; CEO compensation link to share-
holder return; agency theory; stakeholder theory
1. Introduction
In recent years, the topic of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and its disclosure
by international firms has attracted increasing interest across the world. Mark-Herbert
and Von Schantz [1] believe that firms are increasingly aware of their social responsibility
and are more motivated to integrate CSR aspects into their business. The reasons why
companies disclose CSR information are varied. Authors such as Campbell [2] state
that a primary motivation may be to project a responsible image to a broad range of
stakeholders; by presenting CSR reports, firms meet the stakeholders’ demands and also
contribute to society’s well-being [3,4]. Another reason for the disclosure of CSR activities
is the expectation of reward in the form of long-term profitability, potentially enabling
firms to improve their capacity to recruit, reassure shareholders of non-financial risk,
reduce information asymmetry, or improve stakeholders’ decision-making [5]. A third
reason to disclose CSR information stems from a feeling of obligation to do so due to
various types of institutional pressure: firms are economic units that operate in the broader
context of varied institutions that have an impact on their behavior and burden them
with certain expectations [2]. This explains why firms working in countries with similar
institutions adopt similar behaviors. Focusing on such institutions can help to understand
CSR disclosure not simply as voluntary reporting, but also as a requirement imposed by
the entrepreneurial context.
Friede et al. [6] and Busch and Friede [7] have highlighted a substantial body of
research addressing the association between a number of financial and managerial variables
and CSR. However, as Margolis and Walsh [8] did some time ago, it is time to move on to a
different line of research (e.g., Chief Executive Officer (CEO) power and CSR).
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The position of CEO has always been regarded as one of the most powerful in a
firm [9]. The CEO or, more specifically, the power a CEO holds, is a key potential influence
on the firm’s decisions. Agency theory, among others, explains to a great extent the
possible CEO effect as a result of the CEOs’ power in determining the goals of a corporation
including CSR reporting. In line with authors such as Finkelstein [10] and Adams et al. [11],
CEO power (a powerful CEO) can be defined as the capacity of the CEO to address
and overcome opposing positions, both internally (other executives and directors) and
externally (uncertainty), and to influence crucial organizational decisions. CEO power
may derive from the characteristics of the position, since CEOs are expected to be capable
of positioning their firms to create wealth [12] and maximize future opportunities for
stakeholders [13]. Saidu [14] lists the four most relevant power dimensions that may
explain how CEOs can acquire power: (1) structural power (the position or office(s) they
hold, such as Chair of the board, board member, CEO compensation); (2) ownership
power (as a shareholder or founder); (3) expert power (familiarity with the environment
brought by experience, expertise, tenure, skills or a number of positions held in firms);
and (4) prestige power (the capability to absorb uncertainty from the institutional context,
expressed through respect, reputation, or admiration). Further detail about how CEOs
acquire power can be found in Saidu [14]. Hence, the responsibility of CEOs focuses
not only on creating value for shareholders, but also for the workers and community
surrounding the organization [15].
There is little existing research on the impact of CEO power (or powerful CEOs) on
CSR reporting. Jiraporn and Chintrakarn [16] found that the relation between CEO power
and CSR was non-monotonic because, when CEOs are relatively more powerful, CEO
power and CSR disclosure are negatively related. In the same vein, Li et al. [17] reported
a negative relationship between CEO power and CSR disclosure. Among firms listed on
the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 Index, Sheikh [18] found that CEO power was negatively
related to CSR reporting and demonstrated a significant negative association between CEO
power and CSR disclosure in four social dimensions (diversity, community, environment,
and employee relations) and a non-significant association in the product dimension. In the
context of Bangladeshi firms, Rashid et al. [19] proved that businesses with greater levels
of CEO power were negatively associated with CSR disclosure.
To date, therefore, there is little available research on the impact of CEO power
on CSR disclosure. We believe that the topic merits analysis in greater depth and that
further attention should be given to fill the gap in the literature on the impact of CEO
power (powerful CEOs) on CSR reporting. Furthermore, the majority of past research into
CEO power has addressed its effect on the firms’ financial decisions, but little is known
about how CEO power affects the firms’ non-financial decisions such as CSR disclosure.
This research, therefore, aims to provide further evidence on the role of CEO power in
CSR disclosure using a sample of international firms. Additionally, we will analyze the
moderating role of linking CEO compensation to shareholder return on the association
between CEO power and CSR disclosure, since this moderating effect has not previously
been addressed. The theories used to explain this relationship are based on agency theory
and stakeholder theory, which are particularly pertinent in an analysis of how CEO power
influences CSR disclosure. According to agency theory, powerful CEOs will have greater
ability to influence the firms’ decisions. They may use CSR practices as a means to further
entrench their position and, thus, an analysis of the effect of CEO power on CSR disclosure
will shed new light on the literature regarding CEO power. Conversely, stakeholder theory
suggests that the CEO position is always one of the most powerful in a firm. Its power may
stem from its importance because CEOs are expected to be able to position their firms to
create wealth and maximize future opportunities for interest groups, but powerful CEOs
may also fail to act in the best interests of shareholders and stakeholders due to personal
interests [19]. This argument merits further exploration of whether powerful CEOs act
against the best interests of shareholders and stakeholders by decreasing CSR disclosure.
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This research contributes to existing knowledge, first, by extending the current knowl-
edge on how certain CEO power affects CSR disclosure, using a sample of 16 countries. Our
research adds to prior studies based on single countries or specific geographical regions
such as the United States, Hong Kong or Bangladesh by providing evidence about firms
operating in a range of countries. In this regard, CEO power, contrary to the majority
of past evidence, has a positive impact on CSR reporting. Thus, powerful CEOs do not
always behave contrary to the stakeholders’ needs and interests. Simultaneously, this study
also contributes to the analysis of the moderating effect of linking CEO compensation to
shareholder return on the relationship between CEO power and CSR disclosure, an effect
that has not been addressed in previous studies, as far as we know. In this regard, our
evidence shows that, for powerful CEOs, linking CEO compensation to shareholder return
reinforces the positive effect of CEO power on CSR disclosure.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical frame-
work for the association between CEO power and CSR disclosure; Section 3 develops the
hypotheses proposed in this research; Section 4 describes the sample, methodology, and
variables used; Section 5 presents an analysis of the results; and, finally, and Section 6
summarizes our conclusions and the implications of our findings.
2. Theoretical Framework
Studies aimed at analyzing the influence of CEO power on CSR disclosure have tradi-
tionally focused on a single country. For example, the work of Rashid et al. [19] focused
only on Bangladeshi firms and revealed that CEO power was negatively associated with
CSR disclosure, although this negative association appeared to be positively moderated by
the stakeholders’ degree of influence. Thus, while CEO power reduces the level of CSR
disclosure in Bangladeshi firms, stakeholder influence lessens this negative effect of CEO
power on the level of CSR disclosure. Rashid et al. suggest [19] that further empirical
research is required to understand the role of powerful CEOs in the disclosure of CSR infor-
mation. For firms based in the USA, studies such as that by Jiraporn and Chintrakarn [16]
showed that increases in CEO power are associated with greater CSR engagement. How-
ever, this trend is reversed when CEOs are extremely powerful; specifically, the above
study focused on the notion that when CEOs gain power, settle in, and become entrenched,
they no longer invest in CSR disclosure. Indeed, when CEO power rises above a certain
threshold, the most powerful CEOs significantly reduce investment in CSR.
In a study of UK firms, Li et al. [17] found that CEO power negatively affects a firm’s
decision to engage in CSR disclosure. Moreover, they found that the greater the CEO’s
power, the lower the level of CSR activity engaged in by firms, which is diametrically
opposed to the research hypothesis posed in the current study where the greater a CEO’s
power, the more likely it is that a firm will engage in CSR. The latter is consistent with
the findings of Hong et al. [20] and Jo and Harjoto [21], who state that an increase in CEO
power leads to greater CSR engagement.
As for the most common theories used to explain this relationship, agency theory and
stakeholder theory have proved especially useful in analyzing how CEO power influences
CSR disclosure. According to agency theory, certain managers become powerful as a result
of concentrated ownership, long-term tenure, and their position as company founders as
well as in some cases because they play the dual role of CEO and chairperson [22,23]. This
situation can lead deep-rooted and well-established forms of CEO power to be used for
or against shareholder or stakeholder interests [24,25]. In this regard, CEO dominance
affects key firm outcomes and allows CEOs to act in their own interests and not necessarily
in those of shareholders and stakeholders, thus worsening or accentuating the agency
conflict. Powerful CEOs tend not to compromise with other top executives, and make
more extreme decisions, which can negatively affect firms. Accordingly, CEO power may
mitigate the board’s effectiveness and power in monitoring management, weaken internal
control systems, and reduce the boards’ involvement in social activities. Powerful CEOs
may not be motivated to invest in CSR practices if such practices are not linked to their own
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interests [26,27]. Agency theory argues that CEOs will have an interest in investing in CSR
activities if their private profits increase; thus, the more powerful the CEO, the less they are
expected to engage in CSR activities, but rather to focus on working to enhance their own
private benefits. Thus, it can be expected that CEO power fosters managerial entrenchment
and reduces reporting transparency, for instance, discouraging CSR disclosure.
Alongside agency theory, the stakeholder approach is another important theory used
to analyze the relationship between CEO power and CSR disclosure. It adds to agency
theory by arguing that the board of directors is responsible not only for shareholder inter-
ests, but also for those of all stakeholders: the relationship between firms and stakeholders
legitimizes the latter’s eligibility to participate in the firms’ decision-making, so boards
should represent the interests of stakeholder groups. According to Freeman [28], stake-
holder theory suggests that managers engage in CSR reporting to satisfy a broader range
of stakeholders such as the community and society, thus integrating social demands into
the business model. In a similar vein, Harjoto and Jo [29] argued that managers engage
in CSR activities to resolve conflicts between various stakeholders. The debate around
CSR is more complex to understand when CEOs gain power, as that power can affect
CSR reporting [19]. Hence, according to Harper and Sun [30], when CEOs become more
powerful, they may not act in the best interests of stakeholders and shareholders. For
Bebchuk et al. [31], when CEOs become more powerful, they are less likely to engage in
CSR activities and more likely to engage in actions to maximize their own interests such as
holding or even increasing their power at the expense of stakeholders and shareholders,
which suggests a negative relationship between CEO power and CSR disclosure.
3. Research Hypotheses
3.1. Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Power as a Determinant of Corporate Social Responsibility
(CSR) Reporting
According to authors such as Fiegener et al. [32], CEO power can determine board
composition and influence decision-making. Similarly, Dalton and Kesner [33] argue that a
powerful CEO may affect board decisions, ultimately reducing board efficacy [34]. This
is possibly because CEOs often have power over board members as a result of structural
and socio-psychological mechanisms that have a significant impact on decision-making at
the board level [35]. This CEO power can arise from different sources [36] including CEO
duality or family CEO status, among others.
Muttakin et al. [37] state that a more powerful CEO may make decisions that disregard
stakeholder interests, which could result in low levels of social engagement and, therefore,
affect the firms’ disclosure of information. This belief is shared by Weisbach [38], who
emphasizes that various ingrained forms of CEO power can be used to promote self-interest
rather than those of shareholders or stakeholders.
According to Saidu [14], agency theory substantially explains the possible CEO effect,
due to the CEO’s power over determining the goals of a corporation such as CSR reporting.
The power held by CEOs usually insulates them from disciplining and controlling forces
such as boards of directors, the managerial labor market, and/or the market for corporate
control [39]. Entrenched forms of CEO power may be used to advance self-interest rather
than the interests of shareholders or stakeholders. As McWilliams et al. [26] suggest,
powerful CEOs may not be motivated to invest in CSR practices such as CSR disclosure, if
these practices are not linked to their own interests. CSR activities such as CSR disclosure
are effective tools for creating firm value, in contrary to the overinvestment hypothesis
and, therefore, powerful CEOs may consider investment in CSR activities as wasteful.
Additionally, dominant CEOs will discourage CSR disclosure in order to minimize the
public scrutiny and control of outsiders such as potential or actual investors, financial
analysts, the financial press, or other relevant stakeholders. CEO power could, therefore,
restrict the potential of the board to invest in CSR and disclose relevant information
concerning CSR practices.
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Muttakin et al. [37] agree that CEO power is a variable with the potential to negatively
influence the level of CSR disclosure by inhibiting a board’s monitoring ability. In this
regard, powerful CEOs may be more concerned with their own interests and the costs of
CSR practices and, consequently, may negatively influence corporate decisions regarding
CSR activities.
Among the studies on the relationship between CEO power and CSR disclosure,
Jiraporn and Chintrakarn [16] examined the CEO pay slice (CPS) as a proxy for CEO power
and explored how powerful CEOs view investment in CSR. They found that when CEO
power is lower, its increase leads to greater CSR engagement; however, as CEOs grow
significantly more powerful, they become more entrenched and no longer invest as much
in CSR. The study in [16] proposed a threshold beyond which the most powerful CEOs
considerably reduced CSR investment.
Similarly, Harper and Sun [30] believe that when CEOs become more powerful, they
may not act in the best interests of stakeholders and shareholders. Using a sample of
1574 USA-based firms over a period of several years, the authors found a significant and
negative relation between CEO power and CSR activities, suggesting that firms with more
powerful CEOs engaged in less CSR activity. In line with these findings, Rashid et al. [19],
based on a sample of 986 Bangladeshi firms monitored annually from 2002 to 2012, found
that firms with a higher level of CEO power were negatively associated with CSR disclosure.
Similar results were found by Sheikh [18], based on U.S. firms listed on the S&P 500 Index
between 2003 and 2015: their findings showed a significant and negative relationship
between CEO power and the four CSR dimensions of diversity, community, environment,
and employee relations. Chau and Gray [40], using a sample of 273 Hong Kong firms, also
found a negative and statistically significant relationship between CEO power and CSR
disclosure.
Considering the above, the following hypothesis can be posed:
Hypothesis (H1). There is a negative association between CEO power and CSR disclosure.
3.2. CEO Compensation Linked to Shareholder Return as a Moderating Variable
According to agency theory, CEO compensation explains the manager–shareholder
conflict [40] by arguing that, without supervision, managers will maximize their own
wealth at the expense of that of the shareholders. To address the supervision problem,
agency theory suggests incentives for CEOs, offering sufficiently high compensation for
them to align their goals with those of their shareholders [41]. Borlea et al. [27] support
the notion that CEO compensation is an effective corporate governance mechanism in
mitigating conflicts between shareholders and managers: well-paid CEOs will be more
likely to improve firm performance, particularly if their compensation is linked to firm
performance or shareholders’ returns. Furthermore, Fama and Jensen [40], focusing on
agency theory, suggest that the board of directors is a control mechanism, capable of
reducing information asymmetry by voluntarily disclosing relevant information (e.g.,
CSR issues) and aligning ownership and management interests. In this regard, CEO
compensation may also affect the control and monitoring capacity of boards and, therefore,
the quantity and quality of CSR information reported by firms. CSR disclosure may
bring benefits in the long-term such as improved firm performance, higher competitive
advantage, or greater reputation. Thus, and in line with Borlea et al. [27], well-paid CEOs,
particularly those whose remuneration is linked to shareholders’ returns, will be more
likely to encourage CSR disclosure because it will result in a better long-term shareholder
return or firm performance. In this case, more profitable firms will implement better
compensation for CEOs who are paid according to this kind of remuneration structure.
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Authors including Peng [42] note that firms implement a broad variety of CEO com-
pensation packages, and Sanders and Carpenter [43] differentiated between those in the
form of cash (e.g., salary and bonus) and those including long-term contingent pay (e.g.,
stock options and other long-term incentive plans). These two basic forms of compensation
have very different characteristics that can, in turn, affect the executives’ behavior [44].
For example, long-term compensation aligns the interests of executives and shareholders
by offering contractual rewards for increasing shareholder wealth, equivalent to linking
CEO compensation with shareholder return. Peng [42] considers that the characteristics of
long-term compensation make it particularly suited to prospector strategies because it is
more likely to align the interests of managers with the long-term CSR target.
Several studies have examined the effect of CEO compensation on overall CSR perfor-
mance from this empirical perspective. For example, McGuire et al. [45] explored the link
between CEO compensation and CSR, revealing that both salary and long-term compen-
sation are positively related to efficient social performance. A positive relationship was
also reported by Jouber [46], who suggested that the CEO pay slice is positively related
to a firm’s CSR practices and disclosure and found evidence that sustainability is more
pronounced in certain situations such as those where greater investor protection and strict
compliance with the law are found.
Conversely, authors including Deckop et al. [47] and Simerly et al. [48] found evidence
of a negative relationship, revealing that pay with a short-term focus is negatively related to
CSR outcomes. In the same vein, Stanwick and Stanwick [49] also found CEO compensation
to be negatively related to a firm’s social responsibility rating as a result of the executive
director regarding CSR programs only from a financial and cost-related perspective. As
observed by Russo and Fouts [50], this research topic has yielded mixed results with CEO
compensation sometimes positively related to CSR, sometimes negatively and, sometimes,
showing no relationship. There is, thus, no consensus in the existing literature regarding
this relationship.
As far as the influence of CEO compensation on CEO power is concerned, Song and
Wan [51] analyzed this relationship for CEOs of S&P 500 companies from 1993 to 2012,
and found that more powerful CEOs earned more than less powerful ones. This positive
relationship could be regarded as an additional reward for CEOs with better management
skills. According to this logic, higher CEO compensation reflects greater CEO talent and,
thus, may have an impact on the CSR disclosure of firms.
Agency theory, as set out above, suggests creating incentives for CEOs to align their
goals with those of their shareholders. Consequently, if a CEO’s compensation is linked
to shareholder return, the CEO will support CSR decisions that benefit shareholders and
stakeholders. This is particularly true of powerful CEOs, since everything that relates to
CSR can have a positive impact on shareholder profitability [41].
Based on the above, the following working hypothesis can be posed:
Hypothesis (H2). The association between CSR power and CSR disclosure is moderated by linking
CEO compensation to shareholder return.
4. Empirical Design
4.1. Sample
Our initial sample consisted of 13,902 international firm-year observations collected
from the Thomson Reuters database from 2009 to 2018. The total number of firms in the
sample was 1811. However, financial entities and firms for which not all data variables
were available were removed from the initial sample. Financial entities were excluded due
to the particular accounting rules that apply to their annual financial statements, which
makes it difficult to compare the financial statements of financial and non-financial firms.
Thus, our final unbalanced panel data sample comprised 9182 firm-year observations. All
data necessary for measuring our variables were collected from the Thomson Reuters
database, which encompasses companies from different activity sectors across all countries
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in the targeted global indices (FTSE All World, Dow Jones Global, MSCI World, MSCI EMF,
S&P Global, S&P/Citigroup) and is considered the financial industry’s premier source of
detailed financial statement data and profile data on public companies. Thomson Reuters’
data analysts extract the data to global templates that are specific to industry groups. The
templates take into consideration the variations in accounting conventions and are designed
to facilitate comparisons between companies and industries within and across national
boundaries. In addition to economic and financial information, the database contains many
other relevant data about corporate governance and other social and environmental aspects
at an international level.
Sixteen countries are represented in our international sample: Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The country
with the highest representation in our sample was the United States with 34.80%, followed
by Japan with 15.30%, Canada with 11.50%, and the United Kingdom with 11.10%. In
contrast, Austria was represented by only 0.4% of the sample, New Zealand by 0.5%,
Norway by 0.7%, and Belgium by 0.9%. Table 1 shows the distribution of our sample by
country.
Table 1. Number of observations by country.
Country Observations Percentage Cum.
Australia 755 8.2 8.2
Austria 34 0.4 8.6
Belgium 81 0.9 9.5
Canada 1055 11.5 21.0
Denmark 106 1.2 22.1
Finland 137 1.5 23.6
Germany 342 3.7 27.3
Ireland 163 1.8 29.1
Japan 1405 15.3 44.4
The Netherlands 197 2.1 46.6
New Zealand 48 0.5 47.1
Norway 61 0.7 47.7
Sweden 211 2.3 50.0
Switzerland 373 4.1 54.1
The United Kingdom 1018 11.1 65.2
The United States 3196 34.8 100.0
Total 9182 100.0
The industries considered in this research are shown in Table 2, classed according to
the Thomson Reuters Business Classification (TRBC) provided by Thomson Reuters. After
excluding the financial sector, we considered nine of TRBC’s ten industries, specifically,
basic materials (representing 14.50% of the sample), consumer cyclical (19.80%), consumer
non-cyclical (10.00%), energy (9.20%), health care (9.20%), industrial (21.00%), technology
(9.00%), telecommunications services (2.80%), and utilities (4.50%).
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Table 2. Number of observations by activity sector.
TRBC Economic Sector Name Number of Observations Percentage Cum.
Basic Materials 1332 14.5 14.5
Consumer Cyclical. 1814 19.8 34.3
Consumer Non-Cyclical 915 10.0 44.2
Energy 848 9.2 53.5
Health Care 841 9.2 62.6
Industrial 1929 21.0 83.6
Technology 828 9.0 92.6
Telecommunications Services 259 2.8 95.5




The dependent variable used in this research was CSR reporting, denoted by CSR_DISC.
This variable was measured as the ratio between the aggregation of 112 items concerning
environmental and social issues and the total number of items analyzed (112). If the item
considered is disclosed by the firm, it takes the value 1; otherwise, it takes 0. Our CSR
measure is multidimensional, in line with Carroll [52], who suggests that CSR is accepted
as a multidimensional construct focused on various environmental and social aspects
including human rights, product responsibility, and emissions. All the items included in
our analysis for calculating our CSR disclosure variable are shown in Table 3. This variable
ranges between 0 and 1. Accordingly, a firm with 0 points discloses no CSR information,
a firm with 0.1–0.5 points makes a moderate disclosure of CSR information, a firm with
0.6–0.9 points makes a relevant disclosure of CSR information, and a firm with 1 point
makes a complete disclosure of CSR information. Thus, our aim was to analyze the CSR
information reported by firms. Our approach to measuring CSR disclosure is consistent
with past research [53–55].
4.2.2. Independent Variables
Our independent variable was CEO power, labelled as CEO_POW. To construct this
variable, we aggregated three dummy variables: (1) CEO duality, which takes the value 1 if
the same person serves simultaneously as CEO and chairman of the board and 0 otherwise;
(2) CEO tenure, which takes the value 1 if CEO tenure is above the sample median and
0 otherwise; and (3) CEO board membership, which takes the value 1 if the CEO serves
as a board member, but not as chair of the board, and 0 otherwise. This variable will,
therefore, vary between 1 and 3. Its construction is in line with past research [56]. The
existing literature on CEO power considers CEO duality to be a strong source of CEO
power [57]. Furthermore, Finkelstein [10] suggests that CEO tenure increases the influence
of the CEO over the board and its performance and, therefore, CEO power increases.
Tenure is an indicator of a CEO’s knowledge of the policies and processes in the firm
and, once appointed, a CEO is in a position to enhance their own power. Tien et al. [58]
also support the notion that one of the key functions of a board is to monitor and control
top management, and the joint CEO-Director role (where the CEO serves on the board
of directors) can weaken board control and, thus, increase CEO power, as suggested by
agency theory.
Our moderating variable is the linking of CEO compensation to total shareholder
return, denoted as CEO_COMP_SHARHOL and measured as a dummy variable, which
takes the value 1 if the CEO’s compensation is linked to the total shareholder return
and 0 otherwise. We will construct the interaction variable CEO_COMP_SHARHOL ×
CEO_POW in order to analyze whether CEO compensation linked to the total shareholder
return moderates the relationship between CEO power and CSR disclosure.
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Table 3. Corporate social responsibility disclosure items.
Resource Use Emissions Innovation Workforce Human Rights Community ProductResponsibility
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4.2.3. Control Variables
Several factors may potentially affect CSR disclosure. The first control variable used
is firm size (SIZE), measured as the log of total assets. Past research [59] shows that large
firms tend to disclose more CSR information because they are under greater pressure
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from stakeholders than small firms. Return on assets (ROA) and leverage (LEVERAGE)
were also controlled in this research. ROA is calculated as the operating income before
interest and taxes over total assets, and LEVERAGE as the ratio between debt and total
assets. According to previous research [60], more profitable firms (in terms of ROA) are
more likely to report CSR issues because these may have a positive impact on the firm’s
long-term profit. However, there is no conclusive evidence about the effect of leverage on
CSR disclosure. In this regard, Dyduch and Krasodomska [61] present studies that show a
positive relationship between leverage and CSR reporting and those showing a negative
one. Regarding board composition, we have also considered the presence of female
directors (WOMEN_DIRECT) and outsiders (OUTSIDERS) on boards. WOMEN_DIRECT
is calculated as the ratio between the number of female directors on a board and the
total number of directors on the board. As claimed by Pucheta-Martínez and Gallego-
Álvarez [62], board gender diversity is positively associated with CSR disclosure because
female directors tend to be more oriented toward social and environmental issues and are
more open-minded than male directors. OUTSIDERS is measured as the ratio between
the total number of external directors on a board and the total number of directors on
the board. Previous studies [63,64] are inconclusive as to whether board independence or
outsiders affect CSR disclosure, and shows both a positive and a negative effect. The lack
of capability of independent directors on CSR issues would support a negative association
between independent members and CSR disclosure, while their interest in safeguarding
the interests of shareholders, particularly minority shareholders, may be a positive one.
The presence of a CSR committee has also been controlled. This variable is denoted by
CSR_COMMT and is measured as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm
has a CSR committee and 0 otherwise. A positive relationship is expected between the
existence of a CSR committee and CSR disclosure since this committee is directly involved
with CSR issues such as reporting [50]. Board size, labelled as BODSIZE, is also considered
and is calculated as the total number of directors on a board. It is expected that board
size will have a positive impact on CSR disclosure, in line with Pucheta-Martínez and
Gallego-Álvarez [62]. CSR reporting requires additional work and diverse expertise as
well as mechanisms to control and advise boards regarding these issues, which may be
possible with bigger boards. We also controlled for the sector in which firms operate. The
sector is calculated as a dummy variable that will be coded as 1 if the firm operates in the
sector considered and 0 otherwise. This variable is denoted as SECTOR and we considered
nine sectors: basic materials, consumer cyclicals, consumer non-cyclicals, energy, health
care, industrials, technology, telecommunications services, and utilities. Martín-de Castro
et al. [64] found that firms operating in more sensitive industries such as chemical, mining
industries or oil tended to report more CSR information in order to preserve their reputation
and legitimacy in the face of public scrutiny by stakeholders and government. Table 4
shows a summary of all the variables used in this research: dependent, independent, and
control variables.
4.3. Economic Model
Our hypotheses were checked by running the following model:
CSR_DISC it = β0 + β1CEO_POWit + β2SIZEit + β3ROAit + β4LEVERAGEit + B5WOMEN_DIRECTit + β6OUTSIDERSit +
β7CSRCOMMITit + β8BODSIZEit + ∑j=916 βjSECTORSi + ∑βk YEARt + Ψi + εit
(1)
where firm-specific and firm-fixed effects (unobservable heterogeneity) are represented by
Ψi. These effects are controlled because they can potentially impact CSR disclosure. In this
way, we controlled for the unobservable features of firms that oscillate between individuals
and do not change over time. The error terms are represented by εit.
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Table 4. Variables description.
Variables Description Expected Sign
Dependent variable
CSR_DISC Corporate social responsibility disclosure is the ratio between the aggregation of 112items concerning social and environmental issues and the total items (112)
Independent variable
CEO_POW
CEO power is the aggregation of tree dummies variables: (1) CEO duality, which is a
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the same person serves simultaneously as CEO
and chairman of the board and 0, otherwise, (2) CEO tenure, which is a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 if CEO tenure is above the sample median and 0, otherwise and (3)
CEO board member, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO serves




CEO compensation linked to shareholder return is a dummy variable, which takes the
value 1 if the CEO’s compensation is linked to the total shareholder return
(TSR) and 0, otherwise
+
Control variables
SIZE Firm size is the log of total assets +
ROA Return on assets is the operate income before interests and taxes over total assets +
LEVERAGE Leverage is the debt over total assets +/−
WOMEN_DIRECT The proportion of women directors on boards is calculated as the ratio between the totalnumber of women directors on boards and the total number of directors on boards +
OUTSIDERS The proportion of external directors on boards is calculated as the ratio between the totalnumber of external directors on boards and the total number of directors on boards +/−
CSR_COMMT
The presence of a corporate social responsibility committee in firms is a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 if the firm has a corporate social
responsibility committee and 0, otherwise
+
BODSIZE Board size is the total number of directors on boards +
BASIC MATERIALS Dummy variable: 1 = Basic Materials; 0 = Otherwise +/−
CONSUMER CYCLICAL Dummy variable: 1 = Consumer Cyclical; 0 = Otherwise +/−
CONSUMER NON-CYCLICAL Dummy variable: 1 = Consumer Non-Cyclical; 0 = Otherwise +/−
ENERGY Dummy variable: 1 = Energy; 0 = Otherwise +/−
HEALTH CARE Dummy variable: 1 = Healthcare; 0 = Otherwise +/−
INDUSTRIALS Dummy variable: 1 = Industrial; 0 = Otherwise +/−
TECHNOLOGY Dummy variable: 1 = Technology; 0 = Otherwise +/−
TELECOMMUNICATION
SERVICES Dummy variable: 1 = Telecommunication Services; 0 = Otherwise +/−
UTILITIES Dummy variable: 1 = Utilities; 0 = Otherwise +/−
Our model was estimated using the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator
(Arellano and Bond [65]), which offers higher consistency and efficiency than other estima-
tors because it controls for unobservable heterogeneity (Ψi). Additionally, endogeneity and
estimation bias are also controlled by the GMM estimator, which additionally provides us
with the Wald χ2 test, the Arellano–Bond tests—AR(1) and AR(2)—and the Hansen test.
The Wald χ2 test assesses the fitness of our model. The Arellano–Bond test AR(2) assesses
whether a second-order serial correlation exists in the first difference. The rejection of the
null hypothesis of ‘no serial correlations’ confirms the non-existence of a second-order
serial correlation. Finally, the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions assesses whether
the instruments used in the model are suitable.
5. Results
5.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
The descriptive statistics and correlations are provided in Tables 5 and 6, respectively.
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Focusing on the descriptive statistics, firms in our international sample disclosed, on
average, 0.25 CSR information out of a possible maximum of 1. Our CSR score was placed
between 0.1 and 0.5 and, therefore, gave a moderate level of CSR disclosure for firms in our
sample, according to the classification given in the dependent variable description. CEO
power can vary between 1 and 3 and was in this research an average of 1.31, and 50.07%
of firms in our sample linked CEO compensation to shareholder return. The SIZE, ROA,
and LEVERAGE of firms were 9.60, 6.44%, and 62.41%, respectively. Regarding board
composition in firms in our sample, 12.41% of board members were women and 74.14%
were outsiders; 52.78% of firms had a CSR committee, and the average number of board
members was 10.40. In the sample section, the representation of all sectors analyzed in this
research have been discussed.
Table 5. Descriptive analysis.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
CSR_DISC 9182 0.252 0.159
CEO_POW 9182 1.316 0.578
CEO_COMP_SHARHOL 9182 50.076 50.003
SIZE 9182 9.605 1.422
ROA 9182 6.446 7.630
LEVERAGE 9182 62.417 50.661
WOMEN_DIRECT 9182 12.412 11.001
OUTSIDERS 9182 74.144 25.914
CSR_COMMT 9182 52.788 49.924
BODSIZE 9182 10.405 3.252
BASIC MATERIALS 9182 14.500 35.219
CONSUMER CYCLICAL 9182 19.800 39.818
CONSUMER NON-CYCLICAL 9182 10.000 29.955
ENERGY 9182 9.200 28.954
HEALTH CARE 9182 9.200 28.846
INDUSTRIALS 9182 21.000 40.739
TECHNOLOGY 9182 9.000 28.645
TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES 9182 2.800 16.557
UTILITIES 9182 4.500 20.798
Mean and standard deviation, CSR_DISC (corporate social responsibility disclosure) is the ratio between the
aggregation of 112 items concerning social and environmental issues and the total items (112); CEO_POW (CEO
power) is the aggregation of tree dummies variables: (1) CEO duality, which is a dummy variable that takes the
value 1 if the same person serves simultaneously as CEO and chairman of the board and 0, otherwise, (2) CEO
tenure, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if CEO tenure is above the sample median and 0, otherwise
and (3) CEO board member, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO serves as a board member,
but not as chair of the board and 0, otherwise; CEO_COMP_SHARHOL (CEO compensation linked to shareholder
return) is a dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the CEO’s compensation is linked to total shareholder return
(TSR) and 0, otherwise; SIZE (Firm size) is the log of total assets; ROA (Return on assets) is the operate income
before interests and taxes over total assets; LEV is the debt over total assets; WOMEN_DIRECT (Women directors on
boards) is the proportion of women directors on boards = Total number of women directors on boards/Total number
of directors on boards; OUTSIDERS (outsiders on boards) is measured as the proportion of outside directors on
boards; CSR_COMMT (The presence of an corporate social responsibility committee in firms) is a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 if the firm has a CSR Committee and 0, otherwise; BODSIZE (Board size) is the number of
directors on board; Basic Materials if the company operates in Basic Materials sector and 0, otherwise; Consumer
Cyclical if the company operates in Consumer Cyclical sector and 0, otherwise; Consumer Non-Cyclical if the
company operates in Consumer Non-Cyclical sector and 0, otherwise; Energy if the company operates in Energy
sector and 0, otherwise; Health Care if the company operates in Health Care sector and 0, otherwise; Industrials if
the company operates in Industrials sector and 0, otherwise; Technology if the company operates in Technology
sector and 0, otherwise; Telecommunication Services if the company operates in Telecommunication Services sector
and 0, otherwise; Utilities if the company operates in Utilities sector and 0, otherwise.
Sustainability 2021, 13, 3197 13 of 19
Table 6. Correlation matrix.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
CSR_DISC (1) 1
CEO_POW (2) −0.144 *** 1
CEO_COMP_SHARHOL (3) 0.120 *** 0.165 *** 1
SIZE (4) 0.563 *** −0.120 *** 0.109 *** 1
ROA (5) −0.077 *** 0.066 *** 0.081 *** −0.170 *** 1
LEVERAGE (6) 0.161 *** −0.024 ** 0.060 *** 0.278 *** −0.346 *** 1
WOMEN_DIRECT (7) 0.203 *** −0.040 *** 0.288 *** 0.156 *** 0.132 *** 0.066 *** 1
OUTSIDERS (8) 0.086 *** −0.174 *** 0.188 *** 0.145 *** 0.108 *** 0.073 *** 0.390 *** 1
CSR_COMMT (9) −0.121 *** −0.058 *** 0.263 *** 0.123 *** 0.121 *** −0.044 *** 0.239 *** 0.341 *** 1
BODSIZE (10) 0.357 *** −0.096 *** 0.059 *** 0.550 *** −0.081 *** 0.182 *** 0.143 *** 0.136 *** 0.145 *** 1
BASIC MATERIALS (11) 0.049 *** 0.025 ** 0.010 −0.061 *** −0.080 *** −0.030 ** −0.083 *** 0.015 −0.070 *** −0.068 *** 1
CONSUMER CYCLICAL (12) −0.085 *** 0.035 *** −0.045 *** −0.073 *** 0.030 ** −0.029 * 0.038 *** −0.120 *** −0.036 *** −0.014 −0.204 *** 1
CONSUMER NON-CYCLICAL (13) 0.091 *** 0.000 0.028 *** 0.061 *** 0.025 ** 0.085 *** 0.140 *** 0.021 ** −0.009 0.091 *** −0.137 *** −0.165 *** 1
ENERGY (14) −0.099 *** −0.024 *** 0.116 *** 0.041 *** 0.001 −0.076 *** −0.064 *** 0.057 *** 0.170 *** −0.032 ** −0.131 *** −0.158 *** −0.106 *** 1
HEALTH CARE (15) −0.037 *** −0.006 −0.028 *** −0.047 *** 0.100 *** −0.086 *** 0.044 *** 0.093 *** 0.040 *** −0.056 *** −0.130 *** −0.157 *** −0.105 *** −0.101 *** 1
INDUSTRIALS (16) 0.027 ** 0.006 −0.083 *** −0.011 −0.040 *** 0.108 *** −0.111 *** −0.068 *** −0.145 *** 0.038 *** −0.212 *** −0.260 *** −0.172 *** −0.165 *** −0.164 *** 1
TECHNOLOGY (17) 0.010 −0.007 −0.046 *** −0.034 ** 0.098 *** −0.225 *** −0.034 ** −0.030 ** 0.081 *** −0.069 *** −0.130 *** −0.156 *** −0.105 *** −0.100 *** −0.100 *** −0.162 *** 1
TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES (18) 0.025 ** −0.042 *** 0.015 0.094 *** −0.002 0.091 *** 0.061 *** 0.055 *** −0.017 0.065 *** −0.070 *** −0.085 *** −0.057 *** −0.054 *** −0.054 *** −0.088 *** −0.053 *** 1
UTILITIES 19) 0.052 *** −0.037 *** 0.119 *** 0.156 *** −0.154 *** 0.236 *** 0.111 *** 0.099 *** 0.096 *** 0.101 *** −0.090 *** −0.108 *** −0.073 *** −0.070 *** −0.069 *** −0.112 *** −0.069 *** −0.037 ***
CSR_DISC (Corporate social responsibility disclosure) is the ratio between the aggregation of 112 items concerning social and environmental issues and the total items (112); CEO_POW (CEO power) is the
aggregation of tree dummies variables: (1) CEO duality, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the same person serves simultaneously as CEO and chairman of the board and 0, otherwise, (2) CEO
tenure, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if CEO tenure is above the sample median and 0, otherwise and (3) CEO board member, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO
serves as a board member, but not as chair of the board and 0, otherwise; CEO_COMP_SHARHOL (CEO compensation linked to shareholder return) is a dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the CEO’s
compensation is linked to total shareholder return (TSR) and 0, otherwise; SIZE (Firm size) is the log of total assets; ROA (Return on assets) is the operate income before interests and taxes over total assets; LEV is
the debt over total assets; WOMEN_DIRECT (Women directors on boards) is the proportion of women directors on boards = Total number of women directors on boards/Total number of directors on boards;
OUTSIDERS (outsiders on boards) is measured as the proportion of outside directors on boards; CSR_COMMT (The presence of an corporate social responsibility committee in firms) is a dummy variable that
takes the value 1 if the firm has a CSR Committee and 0, otherwise; BODSIZE (Board size) is the number of directors on board; Basic Materials if the company operates in Basic Materials sector and 0, otherwise;
Consumer Cyclical if the company operates in Consumer Cyclical sector and 0, otherwise; Consumer Non-Cyclical if the company operates in Consumer Non-Cyclical sector and 0, otherwise; Energy if the
company operates in Energy sector and 0, otherwise; Health Care if the company operates in Health Care sector and 0, otherwise; Industrials if the company operates in Industrials sector and 0, otherwise;
Technology if the company operates in Technology sector and 0, otherwise; Telecommunication Services if the company operates in Telecommunication Services sector and 0, otherwise; Utilities if the company
operates in Utilities sector and 0, otherwise. * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01.
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As indicated, in Table 6, we exhibit all the correlation pairs in order to check for
multicollinearity; none of the pairs provided a figure higher than 0.8, the figure shown in
past research to be critical [66] in identifying multicollinearity problems.
5.2. Multivariate Analysis
In Table 7, we present Model 1, where the impact of CEO power on CSR reporting is
examined. The CEO_POW variable exhibits a positive sign, contrary to our predictions.
Thus, the first hypothesis must be rejected. This finding suggests that powerful CEOs
tend to support decisions to divulge greater CSR information and runs contrary to past
research [18,19,30], which reveals that CEO power has a negative effect on CSR reporting.
Thus, our evidence shows that CEOs with more power will be less concerned regarding
the cost of CSR activities and their own needs and interests and more oriented toward
disclosing CSR information and focusing on stakeholder needs. It may be that the CEOs’
interests and returns are associated with these CSR activities and, therefore, they are
interested in showing their engagement with social and environmental issues. Thus, CEOs
can also signal their commitment to stakeholders’ needs and interests. It can be a way for
CEOs to mitigate the pressure of powerful stakeholders as well as avoiding or reducing
their supervision, or to improve CEO compensation or tenure. Furthermore, powerful
CEOs may engage in and disclose CSR activities to maintain relationships with relevant
and powerful stakeholders and to maintain human capital against short-term investors
and manage the risk derived from financial and investment strategies. Concerning the
control variables, only the percentage of women directors on boards had a negative impact
on CSR reporting. The remaining control variables were not significant.
The findings may be also relevant from an international perspective because we used
a sample of sixteen countries with varied cultural, political, and corporate governance,
among other differences. In this regard, our findings revealed that powerful CEOs become
pertinent figures in the implementation and functioning of CSR strategies by encouraging
CSR disclosure in non-financial firms across the globe. CSR reporting is, thus, not inde-
pendent from CEO power in firms, power acquired in countries with relevant differences.
Thus, this power may vary among countries. Stakeholders from countries other than those
used in our research may exert pressure on firms in these countries to hire powerful CEOs
because they are more likely to disclose CSR information.
In Table 7, Model 2, we explore the moderating role played by linking CEO compensa-
tion to shareholder return on CEO power and CSR reporting. To analyze this relationship,
we constructed the interaction CEO_COMP_SHARHOL × CEO_POW. As appreciated,
this variable exhibited a positive sign and was statistically significant. This evidence shows
that linking CEOs’ compensation to shareholder return positively moderates the positive
association between CEO power and CSR disclosure, that is, it reinforces the positive
impact of CEO power on CSR reporting. Thus, if CSR disclosure maximizes the share-
holders’ return, powerful CEOs whose compensation is linked to shareholder return will
be more likely to increase CSR disclosure. Higher disclosure and transparency of CSR
information may be beneficial for stakeholders, and particularly shareholders, who can
see an improvement in their returns. Powerful CEOs with pay linked to the shareholder
return may have an interest in supporting a board decision in favor of greater reporting
of CSR issues since this may lead to better compensation for them. Given their influence
over boards, CEOs may persuade many board members to align with them on decisions
oriented toward CSR. In this model, as in Model 1, the only significant control variable was
female directors, which showed a negative sign. The remaining variables were insignificant.
In line with the discussion above, the evidence of the positive moderating role played by
CEO compensation linked to shareholder return on CEO power and CSR disclosure also
merits discussion from an international perspective. Compensation packages for CEOs
differ, depending on the country in which the firms operate. The compensation of CEOs
by stock options allows them the right—with no obligation—to buy a certain number of
company shares in the future at today’s market price, thus enabling CEOs to benefit if the
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company’s stock price rises, but not lose out if it falls. Packages linked to shareholder return
are associated with the rise or fall of a firm’s stock price, resulting in a higher or lower
shareholder return. A good CSR performance can benefit firms in the long term because it
can positively affect stock prices and, consequently, shareholder return. Although such
pay packages are used in most countries, they are more common in some than others,
that is, they are not equally applied in all countries. However, our findings show that
CEOs paid through mechanisms linked to shareholder return, irrespective of the extent
to which these mechanisms are used, have a positive impact on the positive association
between CEO power and CSR reporting. Thus, this type of payment structure for CEOs is
a relevant factor to be considered, particularly for powerful CEOs. Strong stakeholders
around the world interested in demanding more transparency and greater disclosure of
CSR information should also consider how powerful CEOs in firms are paid, given the
positive impact of such mechanisms on CSR disclosure.




CSR_SCORE (t−1) 1.207 *** 1.132 ***








BASIC MATERIALS −0.068 0.085
CONSUMER CYCLICAL −0.163 0.091
CONSUMER NON-CYCLICAL −0.045 0.107
ENERGY −0.035 −0.030
HEALTH CARE −0.092 0.164
INDUSTRIALS −0.057 0.026
TECHNOLOGY −0.129 0.300
TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES −1.063 −0.879
CEO_COMP_SHARHOL −0.423 *
CEO_COMP_SHARHOL × CEO_POW 0.264 *
Year effects Yes Yes
Wald χ2 test 1922.4 *** 3015.02 ***
Arellano–Bond test AR(1) (z, p > |z|) −1.89(0.059) −1.96 (0.051)
Arellano–Bond test AR(2) (z, p > |z|) 1.28(0.200) 1.57 (0.115)
Hansen test (chi−square, p > |chi2|) 10.87(0.285) 11.61 (0.236)
CSR_DISC (Corporate social responsibility disclosure) is the ratio between the aggregation of 112 items concerning
social and environmental issues and the total items (112); CEO_POW (CEO power) is the aggregation of tree
dummies variables: (1) CEO duality, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the same person serves
simultaneously as CEO and chairman of the board and 0, otherwise, (2) CEO tenure, which is a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 if CEO tenure is above the sample median and 0, otherwise and (3) CEO board member,
which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO serves as a board member, but not as chair of the
board and 0, otherwise; CEO_COMP_SHARHOL (CEO compensation linked to shareholder return) is a dummy
variable, which takes the value 1 if the CEO’s compensation is linked to total shareholder return (TSR) and 0,
otherwise; SIZE (Firm size) is the log of total assets; ROA (Return on assets) is the operate income before interests
and taxes over total assets; LEV is the debt over total assets; WOMEN_DIRECT (Women directors on boards) is
the proportion of women directors on boards = Total number of women directors on boards/Total number of
directors on boards; OUTSIDERS (outsiders on boards) is measured as the proportion of outside directors on
boards; CSR_COMMT (The presence of an corporate social responsibility committee in firms) is a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 if the firm has a CSR Committee and 0, otherwise; BODSIZE (Board size) is the number of
directors on board; Basic Materials if the company operates in Basic Materials sector and 0, otherwise; Consumer
Cyclical if the company operates in Consumer Cyclical sector and 0, otherwise; Consumer Non-Cyclical if the
company operates in Consumer Non-Cyclical sector and 0, otherwise; Energy if the company operates in Energy
sector and 0, otherwise; Health Care if the company operates in Health Care sector and 0, otherwise; Industrials if
the company operates in Industrials sector and 0, otherwise; Technology if the company operates in Technology
sector and 0, otherwise; Telecommunication Services if the company operates in Telecommunication Services
sector and 0, otherwise; Utilities if the company operates in Utilities sector and 0, otherwise. * p-value < 0.1,
** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01.
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6. Conclusions
This paper examined how powerful CEOs in firms affect CSR disclosure. Additionally,
it analyzed the moderating role of linking CEOs’ compensation to shareholder return on
the relationship between CEO power and CSR reporting.
The findings show that CEO power, unexpectedly, encourages a greater disclosure of
CSR information. Powerful CEOs may be involved in CSR issues such as greater disclosure,
in contrast to earlier evidence, as a sign of their commitment to the demands and interests of
all stakeholders. It is a means of maintaining good relationships with powerful stakeholders
and avoiding pressure from them. Moreover, our evidence also reports that linking CEOs’
compensation to shareholder returns has a positive influence on the positive association
between CEO power and CSR disclosure. If CSR disclosure is positively associated with
shareholder return, powerful CEOs who are paid with compensation linked to shareholder
return will be more likely to align their decisions with stakeholder demands and interests
and will support board decisions in favor of CSR reporting. One of the most relevant
lessons we have learnt in this paper is the need for more research in this area given the
inconclusive evidence in the existing literature. Our findings about the positive effect of
CEO power on CSR disclosure—using an international sample of firms—are in contrast
to past research conducted in individual countries, which showed a negative association
between CEO power and CSR reporting. As far as we know, no previous studies on
this topic have focused on a sample of international firms and, therefore, we have no
reference for comparing our results from an international perspective, but only from
national perspectives. We can extend this discussion to the moderating role performed
by linking CEOs’ compensation to shareholder return on the relationship between CEO
power and CSR disclosure because, to the best of our knowledge, there is no preceding
evidence of the positive effect of this relationship either. Another lesson learnt in this
paper is that the debate on how CEO power affects CSR disclosure, from both agency
and stakeholder perspectives, should continue. Our evidence is not consistent with the
theoretical reasonings suggested by agency or stakeholder approaches, suggesting a need
to rethink the theoretical backgrounds of these two views with reference to the core topic of
this research or to propose the use of other approaches more consistent with our evidence.
Some implications can be derived from our results. First, our conclusions regarding
the positive effect of CEO power on CSR disclosure may be relevant for policy-makers
when regulating the role of powerful CEOs. In the majority of countries, regulatory bodies
tend to encourage, for instance, the separation of the CEO’s role from that of the chair of
the board (an indicator of CEO power) and, in some cases, this separation is compulsory
by law. Past research also provides evidence in this regard. However, our evidence
seems to indicate that CEO duality is not always as harmful as most norms and corporate
governance codes suggest, given its positive impact on CSR reporting. Second, from an
academic and managerial point of view, our findings suggest, in line with earlier evidence,
that the implementation of management compensation programs linked to shareholder
return may align the interests of stakeholders—specifically shareholders—and managers
(i.e., CEOs) and avoid managerial mischief. This thesis is supported by our findings, which
show that powerful CEOS whose compensation is linked to shareholder returns are likely
to disclose more CSR information, particularly if CSR reporting is positively associated
with shareholder return. Our findings reinforce the theoretical and empirical rationalities
suggested by agency theory regarding the alignment role of a managerial compensation
plan linked to shareholder returns. Finally, our results may also have implications for
stakeholders, shareholders, and firms. Stakeholders may be more interested in those firms
that implement compensation plans for managers—including powerful CEOs—linked to
shareholder return, if CSR activity increases shareholder return, because this may, in turn,
increase CSR disclosure. Shareholders may also benefit from these strategic decisions in
the form of improved returns; they can also demonstrate to society and stakeholders their
commitment to social and environmental matters.
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However, this research also presents some caveats. First, our sample included only 16
countries across the world; it is possible that the inclusion of more countries would have
enriched the findings. The decision not to use a more extended sample including different
contexts was, however, due to a lack of data for other countries. Second, it may be that
theoretical and empirical factors affecting CSR disclosure have been disregarded in this
analysis. Finally, other theoretical perspectives could have been used in the theoretical
framework adopted in this research, but we have selected those that better fit the aim of
this paper.
Our findings suggest a number of lines for future research. Our analysis focused
on non-financial firms. It would be interesting, however, to investigate the following
two questions: (1) whether CEO power in financial firms affects CSR disclosure, and (2)
whether powerful CEOs in financial firms paid with compensation linked to shareholder
returns are more likely to encourage CSR disclosure. Furthermore, the analysis of other
moderating variables such as media pressure or stakeholder influence on CEO power
and CSR disclosure may provide more evidence about the effect of CEO power on CSR
reporting. Finally, other researchers may extend our analysis by comparing how CEO
power, for instance, affects CSR disclosure in different geographical areas. In particular,
it would be interesting to explore the relationship between developed and developing
countries, since we would expect to find differences between these two contexts.
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